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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the relationship between corporate governance and idiosyncratic 
skewness of stock returns. We test this hypothesis by analyzing the impact of external as 
well as internal governance provisions, and are thus able to provide an overall 
understanding of the relationship between governance and firm-specific return 
asymmetries. Our results show that better governance leads to a reduction in idiosyncratic 
skewness in relatively non-competitive industries. In relatively competitive industries, 
governance has less to no impact on firm-specific return skewness. Furthermore, an 
overall increase in transparency, quality and disclosure of information, proxied through 
the Sarbanes Oxley Act, reduces relative idiosyncratic skewness. Our findings can be 
regarded as detrimental for shareholders, who have a preference for positive idiosyncratic 
skewness. The evidence contributes to a debate, which suggests that – at the end of the 
day – an act like Sarbanes-Oxley, which was intended to protect shareholders from 
accounting errors and frauds and to improve the accuracy of corporate disclosures, comes 
at the expenses of shareholders. The reduction of idiosyncratic skewness through better 
governance collides with shareholder’s preference for idiosyncratic and positively 
skewed stock returns, which present a lottery like upside option of monetary gains and 
value creation through the right tail. This side effect of governance is also in line with the 
literature that highlights potential costs of corporate governance. 
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